University of Tennessee College of Law

Legal Scholarship Repository: A Service of the Joel A. Katz Law
Library
UTK Law Faculty Publications
1988

Nationwide Preclearance of Section Five of the 1965 Voting
Rights Act: Implementing the Fifteenth Amendment
Dwight Aarons

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.utk.edu/utklaw_facpubs
Part of the Law Commons

DATE DOWNLOADED: Fri Apr 8 13:36:41 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
Dwight Aarons, Nationwide Preclearance of Section Five of the 1965 Voting Rights Act:
Implementing the Fifteenth Amendment, 11 NAT'l BLACK L.J. 93 (1988).
ALWD 7th ed.
Dwight Aarons, Nationwide Preclearance of Section Five of the 1965 Voting Rights Act:
Implementing the Fifteenth Amendment, 11 Nat'l Black L.J. 93 (1988).
APA 7th ed.
Aarons, D. (1988). Nationwide preclearance of section five of the 1965 voting rights
act: implementing the fifteenth amendment. National Black Law Journal, 11(1), 93-116.
Chicago 17th ed.
Dwight Aarons, "Nationwide Preclearance of Section Five of the 1965 Voting Rights
Act: Implementing the Fifteenth Amendment," National Black Law Journal 11, no. 1
(1988-1990): 93-116
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Dwight Aarons, "Nationwide Preclearance of Section Five of the 1965 Voting Rights
Act: Implementing the Fifteenth Amendment" (1988) 11:1 Nat'l Black LJ 93.
AGLC 4th ed.
Dwight Aarons, 'Nationwide Preclearance of Section Five of the 1965 Voting Rights
Act: Implementing the Fifteenth Amendment' (1988) 11(1) National Black Law Journal 93
MLA 9th ed.
Aarons, Dwight. "Nationwide Preclearance of Section Five of the 1965 Voting Rights
Act: Implementing the Fifteenth Amendment." National Black Law Journal, vol. 11, no.
1, 1988-1990, pp. 93-116. HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Dwight Aarons, 'Nationwide Preclearance of Section Five of the 1965 Voting Rights
Act: Implementing the Fifteenth Amendment' (1988) 11 Nat'l Black LJ 93
Provided by:
University of Tennessee College of Law Joel A. Katz Law Library
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

NATIONWIDE PRECLEARANCE OF SECTION FIVE
OF THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT:
IMPLEMENTING THE FIFTEENTH
AMENDMENT
Dwight Aarons

INTRODUCTION

In an effort to effectuate the purpose of the fifteenth amendment,' Congress passed the 1965 Voting Rights Act ("Act").2 President Lyndon Johnson
hailed the Act as a "triumph for freedom as huge as any ever won on any
battlefield."' 3 Yet even after more than 20 years as a statute, the voting rights
of citizens still are abridged by states and subdivisions within states on account
of race. This phenomenon has many dimensions, but has been collectively
referred to as vote dilution.4
This Comment argues that technological sophistication has outdated and
diminished the effectiveness of the Act.5 Primarily, this Comment suggests
that despite the recent amendment to section 2 of the Act, which has been one
of the most effective swords for eradicating minority vote dilution, that section
has now become a plowshare. In contrast, section 5 of the Act, which has
previously been regarded as nothing more than a shield against the implemen1. The fifteenth amendment provides:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. U.S.
CONST. AMEND. XV.

2. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973bb
(1982)) (enacted pursuant to § 2 of the fifteenth amendment).
3.

1982 U.S. CONG. & AD. NEWS 177.

4. Some of these practices include purges of registration rolls, changing voting places on short
notice, the establishment of difficult registration procedures; decreasing the number of voting machines in minority areas; and the threat of reprisals for exercising the right to vote. See generally
MINORITY VOTE DILUTION (C. DAVIDSON ed. 1984).

There are four general categories of racial gerrymandering: at-large voting, and the cracking,
stacking, and packing of minority voters in a single-member districts. See Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative Reappointment, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra, at 85-117; see also
Parker, County Redistrictingin Mississippi. Case Studies in RacialGerrymandering,44 MISS. L.J. 391
(1973). This Comment focuses on the phenomenon of racial gerrymandering as it occurs in singlemember districts.
At-large member districts can dilute a racial minority group's voting strength if the district is
sufficiently large enough to ensure that the minority's voting age population within the district is less
than that of another racial group. However the phenomenon of stacking, packing and cracking a
racial minority's group voting strength are the consequences of discriminatory line drawing among
district boundaries and consequently occur only in single-member districting systems.
The impact of legislative as well as executive decisions to annex and to deannexate neighboring
communities and the incorporation of predominately White enclaves is of the same phenomenon.
5. This Comment is premised on the assumption that racial bloc voting occurs; that our society
has a limited amount of goods and services; that our political system exacerbates the differences
among the political winners and losers and that voters justifiably cast their ballots in hopes of implementing policies that are primarily beneficial toward themselves.
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tation of more oppressive practices of vote dilution, should be interpreted to
apply throughout the United States in order to fully effectuate the original
purposes of the Act.6
I.

MINORITY VOTE DILUTION UNDER THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

The Voting Rights Act was passed pursuant to Congress' authority under
section 2 of the fifteenth amendment. 7 The principle weapons for securing
voting rights are sections 2 and 5 of the Act.
A.

Section 2

Section 2 allows citizens in any political subdivision in the country to
challenge existing voting practices. The 1982 amendments obviate the need
for proving intent and avoid characterizing legislative actions as being racially
motivated.' Now, in order to prove a violation of section 2, plaintiffs need
only show that the challenged electoral practice results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race
or color or language of a minority group.
Plaintiff's case often relies upon certain social and institutional factors9 in
6. Allegations of the denial of the right to vote can rest upon a combination of constitutional
claims, including the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the fifteenth amendment's
prohibition of abridgement on account of race or under § 2 and § 5 of the 1965 Voting Rights Act.
This Comment addresses claims that have traditionally been brought pursuant to § 5 of the Act.
This Comment also suggests that § 2 and § 5 of the Act ought to be interpreted as complementary
provisions upon which a plaintiff can state a cause of action rather than alternatives from which a
plaintiff must choose.
7. The Voting Rights Act was not Congress' first attempt to secure voting rights for racial
minorities. See, eg., Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884) (Civil Rights Act of 1870 is a valid
exercise of congressional power to protect the right to vote in congressional elections); United States
v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (fifteenth amendment guarantees congressional protection of the constitutional right to be free from racial discrimination in the exercise of the franchise).
8. The full text of § 2, as amended, reads:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results
in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account
of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) [language minority status] of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of
circumstances, if it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in
the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class
of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representative of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been
elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a
protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (b) (West Supp. 1988).
9. The Senate Report approved of the use of criteria first articulated in Zimmer v. McKeithen,
485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973)(en banc), aff'd on other grounds sub. nom., East Carrol Parish
School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). Zimmer outlined the factors necessary to maintain a
constitutional standard for vote dilution claims, without regard to the discriminatory intent of the
legislators. Those factors are: the extent to which history or official discrimination in the state or
political subdivision has effected the right of the member of the minority group to register, vote, or
otherwise participate in the democratic process; the extent to which voting in the elections of the state
or political subdivisions is racially polarized; the extent to which the state or political subdivision has
used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or
other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the
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order to infer that racial minorities are not able to participate in elections on
an equal footing with non-minority group members.'" In other words, to allege a section 2 claim plaintiffs have to show that in the "totality of the circumstances" within the jurisdiction of the electoral system, as presently
structured, denies minorities equal access to the political process. Consequently, the success or failure of vote dilution cases under section 2 may simply depend upon the resources of the plaintiff and the manner in which the
evidence is perceived by the trier of fact.
A proviso, known as the Dole Compromise, was part of the 1982 amendments, it warns that section 2 does not guarantee proportional representation.
Thus, in light of the Dole Compromise, it appears that section 2 classifies vote
dilution by simply looking to the past success of the minority group in the
political system in comparison to de jure discriminatory practices. '
B.

Interpretationof Section 2

The Supreme Court interpreted the amended section 2 in Thornburg v.
Gingles."2 The plaintiffs in Gingles challenged one single-member district and
six multi-member districts drawn under a reapportionment plan by the North
Carolina General Assembly to redistrict the state's Senate and House of Representatives. The plaintiffs alleged that the redistricting scheme impaired
Black citizen's right to vote in violation of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments and section 2. The district court found that North Carolina had officially discriminated against Black's exercise of the franchise from 1900 to
1970; historic discrimination in education, housing, employment and health
services; continuing practical impediments of Blacks to elect representatives of
their choice; racially polarized voting; and that Blacks had disproportinately
not been elected to political office in the districts in question and throughout
the state.
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the 1982 amendments made
clear that a violation of section 2 could be proved by showing discriminatory
results alone, rather than discriminatory purpose, and that the amendments
established the relevant legal standard of the results test. 3 The Court affirmed
minority group; if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group

have been denied access to that process; the extent to which members of the minority group in the
state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment
and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
Because § 2 claims are grounded in the proof of a substantial number of factors one commentator has noted that "the central limitation of section 2, then, is that in failing to articulate a theory of
equal electoral opportunity, it ultimately offers little guidance for those courts seeking to depart from
the Zimmer factors." Note, Geometry and Geography: Racial Gerrymanderingand the Voting Rights
Act, 94 YALE L.J. 189, 198 (1984) (authored by Howard M. Shapiro).

10. A correct calculation of whether or not racial vote dilution occurs should factor out instances of a minority group's failure in the political system, from a group's perpetual inability to use
the political system to their advantage due solely on account of racial discrimination and the structure
of the electoral system. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4. (1938).
11. Section 2 is overinclusive as it attempts to account for all of the possible reasons why minor-

ity voters are not effective in the political system, consequently minority voters bear the burden of this
shot-gun blast approach.
12. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).

13. Justice Brennan, in writing for the majority, articulated three critical factors that must be
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the totality of the circumstances test applied by the district court and held that
the redistricting plan diluted Black votes in the disputed districts.
Despite the new amendments and the incorporation of the results test
under section 2, plaintiff still carries a heavy burden of fact gathering and
proof. Moreover, application of the section depends upon balancing numerous factors, which for the most part depends upon a trier of fact's interpretation of the Zimmer factors, while at the same time the remedy is limited in
that section 2 claims cannot guarantee proportional representation."l These
difficulties are only exacerbated by the lack of a single opinion in Gingles."5
C.

Section 5
Section 5 suits can only be brought in jurisdictions with a history of racial
discrimination and low minority voter participation. 6 These jurisdictions are
prevalent in a series of elections rather than in a single election. First, the minority group must be
politically cohesive. Second, the minority group must be large enough and geographically compact to
constitute a single member district. Third, he noted that racial bloc voting is a prerequisite for bringing a vote dilution claim. Racial bloc voting would serve to ascertain whether the minority group's
candidate choice was defeated when Whites voted as a group to defeat the minority's preferred candidate. If these factors do exist in multi-member districts, then plaintiffs have a greater likelihood of
success in a vote dilution claim.
However, in part III-C of his opinion, in which he enunciated the proper statistical and
evidentary standards for vote dilution claims, Justice Brennan was joined only by a plurality of the
Court. He concluded that plaintiffs need not prove causation or intent to prove racial bloc voting and
that defendants may not rebut a case with evidence of causation or intent.
Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, joined by three other Justices, agreed that statistical evidence of divergent racial voting patters could establish that minority groups are politically cohesive
and that such evidence could not be refuted by other evidence that the voting patterns were the result
of something other than race. However she advocates the use of circumstantial evidence in the inquiry on whether vote dilution exists in order to ascertain whether the minority group's lack of
electoral success is attributable to factors other than racial bloc voting.
14. In order to avoid this dilemma one student suggests that "courts should, as a matter of
course, remit consideration of the appropriate remedy for a proven section 2 violation to the responsible local authority. The proposed remedial changes in voting procedures would then be subject to the
preclearance provisions of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act." Comment, Vote Dilution,Discriminatory Results, and ProportionalRepresentation: What is the Appropriate Remedy for a Violation of
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1203, 1208 (1985) (authored by Robert
Barnes).
While this procedural guise is indeed attractive, it is insufficient for those states and political
subdivisions not subject to § 5, which is most of the United States, particularly most inner city communities of the North and West.
. 15. One perceptive group of scholars has noted that the Court's analysis adopts a "functional"
approach that considers whether a majority of Black voters regularly vote as a bloc and the extent to
which Black supported candidates are regularly elected. Thus under the majority's analysis the postGingles standard of § 2 centers on actual outcomes rather than the voting preferences of Black and
White voters. Justice O'Connor's concurrence, in contrast, is more faithful to the pre- City of Mobile
v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), cases in that it is a contextual approach that takes into account factors
such as the presence or absence of a majority vote rule, seats up for election and the number of
candidates running.
Future cases must decide whether the Court equates polarized voting with vote dilution or
whether it endorses the more elaborate Zimmer factors. Jacobs and O'Rourke Racial Polarizationin
Vote Dilution Cases UnderSection 2 of the Voting Rights Act: The Impact of Thornburgv. Gingles, 3
J. L. AND POL. 295 (1986).

Another scholar notes that since only a plurality of the Court agreed with Brennan's definition of
racial bloc voting, Gingles fails to provide necessary guidelines to lower courts on how to determine
what degree of racial polarization constitutes racial bloc voting in order to maintain a § 2 claim.
Note, Thornburg v. Gingles: The Supreme Court's New Test for Analyzing Minority Vote Dilution, 36
CATH. U.L. Rnv. 531 (1987) (authored by Mary J. Kosterlitz).
16. Voter participation is traditionally defined to mean voter turnout. But see Harrison, The
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required to preclear voting laws or procedures with the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia or with the United States Attorney General. 17 The standard that the district court and the Attorney General apply is
whether the change will have the purpose or effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color, if it does then preclearance will be
denied.
D. Interpretation of Section 5
The Supreme Court has broadly interpreted section 5. In South Carolina
v. Katzenbach'8 the Court considered the constitutionality of major provisions
of the Act. The Court emphasized that Congress had adopted the Act because
"sterner and more elaborate measures" were necessary to combat the
"unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution" by states which perpetuated the insidious and pervasive evil of racial discrimination in voting
procedures.9 Those sterner measures of the Act, namely section 5's suspension of the voting tests and preclearance requirement, were an appropriate
vehicle to enforce Congress' responsibility. The Court concluded that pursuant to section 2 of the fifteenth amendment Congress had the full remedial
powers to effectuate the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination in voting.
Section 5's coverage formula is outlined in section 4(b). The Court ac-

cepted the coverage formula under 4(b) as "rational." Section 4(b) is triggered

if the state was one of those which on the effective date of the Act employed a
test or device as a prerequisite to voting and in which less than 50% of eligible
voters were registered to vote or actually voted in the preceding presidential
election.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court observed that, as evidence of disenRelationship Between Black PoliticalParticipationand the Voting Rights Act, 11 NAT'L BLACK L.J.
79 (1989); see also Black Participationin the PoliticalProcess: Myth or Reality? 2 BLACK L.J. (1972).
There are other methods by which citizens can demonstrate their approval or disapproval of contending political platforms. Individuals can decide to support a candidate who has little, if any, realistic
chance of winning as a symbolic gesture, decide not to cast a ballot or participate in other ways, such
as by raising campaign funds and encouraging others to vote.
17. Section 5, in pertinent part, reads:
Whenever a State or political subdivision ... [covered under section 4(b)] ...

shall elect or

seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice,
or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on... [the applicable date of comparison] ... such State or subdivision may institute an 'action in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such
qualifications, prerequisite, standard or practice, or procedure does not have the purpose
and will not have the effect or denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color, in contravention to the guarantees set forth in [section 4 (f)(2), protecting certain
language minorities], and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be
denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard,
practice or procedure:
Provided,That such qualification ... has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other
appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney
General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission ... Any
action under this section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of Title 28 and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme
Court.
42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1982).
18. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
19. Id. at 329-31.
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franchisement, Congress began with reliable data of existing voting discrimination and that section 5 applied if the states or political subdivisions
employed tests or devices for the 1964 presidential election and had less than
50% of its non-White residents of voting age registered to vote.
As to the underinclusiveness of the formula, in light of evidence that
other regions of the nation which practiced voting discrimination through
methods other than voting tests and devices and were not subject to section 5,
the Court declared that legislation need not eliminate everything at the same
time.2 °
In Allen v. State Board of Elections21 the Court held that section 5 applied not only to tests or devices that could deny minority voters the opportunity to cast a ballot, but also to electoral structures that could dilute the
strength of minority voters. Therefore, such practices as numbered posts elections,2 2 staggered terms, the changing of positions from elective to appointive
or anti-single shot voting requirements 23 now have to be precleared in covered
jurisdictions.2 4
Further, in Georgia v. United States 25 the Court declared that legislative
redistricting is a voting change that has to be precleared under section 5.
Before the Court in Georgia was the reapportionment plan for the state legislature. The proposed plan decreased the number of single member districts
from 118 to 105 and increased the number of multi-member districts from 47
to 49. The prior apportionment plan had generally followed county lines, but
the proposed plan did not as 31 of the 49 multi-member districts and 21 of the
56 single-member districts irregularly crossed county boundaries. Georgia
state law required a run off election if a majority of the vote was not won in
the general election and state law required numbered posts elections in multimember districts. The Attorney General denied preclearance because of these
factors.
A second reapportionment plan, even though it increased the number of
single member districts to 128 and decreased the multi-member districts to 32,
was also denied approval by the Attorney General. The Court agreed with the
Attorney General's contention that under such conditions, these changes have
the potential of diluting the Black population voting strength.
After Georgia, preclearance appears to be a bargaining tool that the Attorney General can use to ensure that minority voting strength is not diluted.
For instance, if single member districts were created and the state's majority
vote requirement in multi-member districts was eliminated, then it appears
that the proposed electoral changes in Georgia would have had a greater
20. Id. at 331.
21. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
22. Numbered post elections require candidates to choose one of the numbered spots on the
ballot that they are running for in a multi-member election. This, in effect, turns a multi-member
election into a composition of smaller elections for each available numbered post.
23. Single-shot or bullet voting is the selection of fewer than the number of selections allowed on
a ballot. The significance of such a practice is that it results in a vote being cast of an individual's
preferred candidates only, rather than casting votes for almost all the candidates. Single-shot voting
can be prohibited by not counting ballots which do not select the minimum number of candidates
required.
24. The Court extended Allen in Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 370 (1971), to require
preclearance for polling place location changes in covered jurisdictions.
25. 411 U.S. 526 (1973).
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chance of being precleared. This bargaining between the state and federal authorities is necessary to ensure that a minority group's voting strength is protected. Nevertheless, even with the creation of single member districts, federal
authorities should still preclear the proposed redistricting schemes in order to
prevent discriminatory line drawing.
1. Non-Retrogression Test
The application of section 5 does appear to possess a major limitation. In
Beer v. United States2 6 the Court construed section 5 to prohibit only those
changes that would have a retrogressive effect on preexisting minority voting
strength.
Beer involved the redistricting of the New Orleans city council. The city
charter required a seven member council, with one member being elected from
each of the five districts and two being elected by the voters at-large. In 1961,
using the data in the 1960 census, the city redistricted the council districts.
In one of the newly drawn districts Blacks composed a majority of the
population but were only half of the registered voters. In four other districts
White voters outnumbered Black voters. For the next nine years no Black was
elected to the council. In 1970 a new city plan was adopted that provided for
Black population majorities in two districts, but a Black voter majority in only
one district.
The Court held that in order to pass the preclearance requirement of section 5, a proposed change must enhance or leave unchanged the position of
minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the franchise.2 7 The
change also must not otherwise discriminate on the basis of race or ethnic
group status so as to violate constitutional standards.2" It appears that the
Court interpreted the section by looking at the voting strength of a minority
group, as it existed prior to the proposed voting change, as the benchmark that
can not be retrogressed in the new voting scheme.
In practice, however the non-retrogression test of Beer has not proven to
be a hindrance to the application of section 5. Rather non-retrogression is the
starting point for analyzing proposed electoral changes, a secondary inquiry is
whether the change violates the fourteenth or fifteenth amendments.2 9 If the
26. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
27. Id. at 141.
28. Id. Consistent with the non-retrogression test established in Beer the Court considered the
effect of annexations on the voting potential of minority voters in Richmond v. United States, 422
U.S. 358 (1975). The Court held that reducing the relative political strength of the minority race in
the enlarged city as compared to what it was before the annexation did not violate § 5, as long as the
post-annexation city fairly recognizes the minority group's political potential.
The Court was not blind to the obvious, as it did recognize that the Black community would
have fewer council seats in the enlarged city, and if there was an at-large voting scheme and racially
polarized voting then Blacks could be excluded from the post-annexation city government. As in
Georgia, the Court seems to suggest that the problems associated with the annexation of a majority
White population area can be obviated if at-large election districts are replaced with single-member
districts. See id. at 368-71.
29. See, eg., White v. Register, 412 U.S. 755 (1972) (multi-member districts in Dallas and Bexas,
Texas counties violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, aff'd on othergrounds sub. nom. East Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S.
636 (1976) (factors which establish an equal protection violation); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339 (1960) (redrawing city boundaries to effectively disenfranshise Black voters in municipal elections
violates the fifteenth amendment); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (White primary estab-
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change violates either prong then preclearance has been denied.30
E. Comparison Between Section 2 and Section 5
Cases brought pursuant to section 5 differ from cases brought under section 2 in several respects. States or local jurisdictions have enacted and implemented the redistricting plan being challenged in section 2 cases. By contrast,
in jurisdictions under section 5, redistricting plans enacted by states or localities cannot be implemented until federal preclearance has been obtained.
Thus, not only are section 5 claims filed by the state or local political
bodies to prove that the proposed plans do not have a discriminatory purpose
or effect, but under section 2 it is the minority voters who have to prove that
the existing districting plan has been enacted or maintained for discriminatory
purposes. Consequently the much litigated section 2 places a greater onus on
the aggrieved minority.3 1

II.

NATIONWIDE APPLICATION OF SECTION

5

The fourteenth and fifteenth amendments provide the foundation for both
the right to vote and the major provisions of the Act. The Supreme Court has
continually affirmed that section 5 of the fourteenth amendment and section 2
of the fifteenth amendment invest Congress with broad powers to enforce the
substantive rights of those amendments. Yet, in 1982, when section 2 was
amended, Congress refused to amend section 5 to apply nationally.
It has been argued that while section 5 does provide unique procedural
protections, it has a less stringent substantive standard than cases arising
under section 2,32 yet despite the non-retrogression test the major limitation
on section 5 is its that its application is limited to only all or parts of 22
lished by the state political convention is an abridgment of the right to vote in violation of the fifteenth amendment); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (exclusion of Black voters from the
"preprimary" election process violates the fifteenth amendment).
Since the Zimmer factors, which establish a fourteenth amendment violation have been incorporated under § 2, the practical effect of the second prong of the preclearance analysis is to ascertain
whether § 2 has been violated. Moromura, PreclearanceUnderSection S of the Voting RightsAct, 61
N.C.L. REv. 189, 245-46 (1983). See supra note 6.
30. The Court has continued to interpret § 5 expansively. In Pleasant Grove v. United States,
479 U.S. 462 (1987), preclearance was denied, in part, because the proposed annexation change had
the potential future effect of diluting minority voting strength.
31. It is conceded that § 5 can only be invoked when a voting change occurs while § 2 can be
used to challenge an existing electoral system. This distinction becomes most significant when plaintiffs in jurisdictions that are subject only to § 2 bring racial gerrymander suits. See, e.g., Latino
Political Action Comm. v. City of Boston, 609 F. Supp. (D.Mass. 1985) (no violation of section 2),
aff'd, 784 F.2d 709 (1st Cir. 1986); Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398 (7th Cir. 1984) (same); Cousins
v. City Council of Chicago, 322 F. Supp. 428 (N.D. Ill. 1971), aff'd, 503 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1974)
(same).
Moreover, under § 5 plaintiff should present a prima facie case that shows that the results or
effects of a proposed redistricting scheme disproportionately impacts upon a minority racial group
which would shift the burden of proof to the state or political subdivision. This procedure is consistent with other antidiscrimination statues. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973)(after proof of a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Title VII burden
shifts to employer to articulate legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the employee's rejection);
Duke v. Griggs Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (Title VII requires employer to justify that employment tests reasonably measure job performance).
32. Despite the unclear impact of the 1982 amendments as interpreted by Gingles, plaintiffs still
might contend that § 2's broad based inquiry approach is better than § 5's non-retrogression limita-
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states.3 3 Section 2, in contrast, has applied nationwide since its passage. The
reason for reluctance in the application of section 5 nationwide is due to its
"uncommon exercise of congressional power."3 4
In fact, as Congress considered whether to amend section 5 to apply nationally there were four reasons generally put forth as to why such a step was
unwarranted.35 First, shortly after the Act was passed the Supreme Court
found that the coverage formula was "rational in both practice and theory."
Second, the Court's reasoning was based upon the extensive congressional
findings in the legislative history of voting rights abridgement in the covered
jurisdictions. These two claims can be considered as one as they both seem to
evidence a concern that federal preclearance is punitive.

Third, the Act already contained a trigger formula, in section 4, under

which the federal district court could order preclearance in a state or political
subdivision not presently covered. Finally, there was the potential for serious
administrative problems with nationwide preclearance as slightly more than a
dozen employees reviewed all submissions from covered jurisdictions.
While these are valid considerations, they are more the product of pessimism than pragmatism. Moreover, each contention can be obviated to allow
for nationwide application of section 5 and the elimination of racial
gerrymandering.
A.

Gerrymanders

Gerrymandering has been defined as discriminatory districting which operates to unfairly inflate the political strength of one group and deflate that of
another.3 6 The goal of a gerrymander is to create a scheme that will cause the
targeted group to waste a substantial proportion of its votes in electing a cantion. See, e.g., Note, GettingResults UnderSection 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 94 YALE L.J. 139, 140
(1984) (authored by Mark E. Haddad).
However, as another scholar has pointed out, § 2 is particularly inappropriate for racial gerrymanders. Note, supra note 9, at 195.
33. Section 5 originally covered Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, and Yuma County in Arizona, Honolulu County in Hawaii, and 39 counties in North Carolina.
H. R. REP. No. 397, 91ST CONG., lsT SEss. 3 (1969).
Added to coverage is also Alaska, Arizona, Texas and parts of California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, North Carolina, South Dakota, and Wyoming. 46 FED. REG. 879-80 (1981).
While this Comment concedes that Beer limits the overall effectiveness of § 5, nationwide coverage of voting rights laws or changes as defined under § 4 would nevertheless all but eliminate racial
gerrymanders.
34. See, eg. Dougherty County Bd.of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 48 (1978)(Powell, J., dissenting); United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 141 (1978)(Stevens, J.,
dissenting);
Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 504 (1977); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556
(1969).
35. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON S. 1922, S.REP. No. 417, 97TH CONG., 2D
S.ss. 15 (1982), cited in Days and Guinier, Enforcement ofSection 5 of Voting Rights Act in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION,supra note 4, at 172-73.
36. R. DIXON, The Court, the People, and 'One Man, One Vote' in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE
1970's at 7, 29 (N. Polsby ed. 1971). Gerrymanders present difficult problems of proof as as Congressman Abner Mikva aptly put it, "[It is] somewhat like pornography. You know it when you see
it, but it's awfully hard to define." HEARINGS ON H.R. 8953, AND RELATED PROPOSALS BEFORE
SUBcOMMITTEEs No. 5 OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 92D CONG. 1ST SESS. 98 (1971).
Usually a redistricting plan is only limited by the fact that districts are generally compact and
contiguous and traditional political subdivision boundaries are followed. Engstrom, The Supreme
Court and Equipopulous Gerrymandering: A Remaining Obstacle in the Questfor Fairand Effective
Representation, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 277, 281.
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didate or to disperse the voting group so that it supports a number of loosing
candidates. Equipopulous gerrymandering is districting that satisfies the one
person one vote requirement of Reynold v. Simms,37 yet is discriminatory toward an identifiable group of voters.38 When the identifiable group of voters is
a racial minority then the fifteenth amendment is violated.3 9
Gerrymanders can be brought about through various methods. For instance, a phenomenon known as as cracking involves canceling out a population group that is concentrated in an area large enough for separate
representation by breaking up the population into two or more districts with
members from groups who are hostile to the cracked group's voting interests.' Alternatively, a redistricting plan might pack a group's vote by concentrating the voters in an area so that they provide excessive support for winning
candidates.4 1 A third method of diluting a group's voting strength is through
stacking, or putting a large population concentration together with an even
larger second voting group. The effect of such a configuration would usually
deprive the first group of voters of a majority in a district.4 2
Today computers can produce variety of compact, contiguous districts
and can also analyze politically relevant information so that the consequences
of various schemes can be effectively predicted.4 3 What is needed is an effective constitutional protection against discriminatory reapportionment
schemes. 44
37. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
38. Single-member winner take all residential districts inherently dilute some votes as a result of
the possible concentration of group voting. Thus an appropriate standard of proof should require
that an identifiable cohesive group is diluted beyond what could normally be expected. Engstrom,
supra note 36, at 282.
39. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
40. Parker, Racial Gerrymanderringand Legislative Disapportionmentin MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 4, at 89. One of the best illustrations of cracking involved Mississippi congressional districting. In 1966 the state legislature redrew the congressional district lines horizontally in
an east-west fashion that cracked the heavy Black voting population into four of the state's five
congressional districts. If the state had maintained its practice of drawing district lines in a northsouth direction then the Delta region, which was predominately populated by Blacks in the northwestern part of the state, would have at least accounted for one of the congressional districts. Id. at
89-92.
Cracking can also occur in large urban areas where a minority group could constitute a majority
of a contiguous election district.
41. Id. at 96. Packing can also occur when there is extensive population growth. Wright v.
Rockerfeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), is the seminal case of packing. In Wright minority voters were
concentrated into one of four congressional districts. In this district minority voters comprised 86
percent of the population but in the adjoining districts they comprised only 29, 28 and 5 percent.
42. Parker, Racial Gerrymanderingand Legislative Reapportionment in MINORITY VOTE DILU-

TION, supra note 4 at 92-96. Stacking can occur in both multi- and single-member districts.
43.

T. O'ROURKE, REAPPORTIONMENT: LAW, POLITICS AND COMPUTERS 87 (1972).

44. Various suggestions have been proposed by other commentators. For instance, one early
writer simply advocated that the courts become more sensitive to the problem and announce some
justiciable standard. Parker, County Redistricting in Mississippi Case Studies in Racial Gerrymandering, supra note 4. Another has suggested programming a computer to randomly produce districts
with a quantitative measure of group voting strength to measure the minority voting strength before
and after the proposed districting scheme. Computer produced plans that did not overstep a certain
point would be implemented. Comment, Racial Gerrymandering,51 CHI-KENT. L. Rv. 584 (1974).
A third suggestion is to treat apportionment like school districting and select a commission to
draw the district lines. Gottlieb, Identifying Gerrymanders, 15 ST. Louis U.L.J. 540 (1971). However, this is insufficient insofar as the contest then would be over the selection of members for the
commission.
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Some might argue that there is little distinction, if any, between political
and racial gerrymanders. Moreover, in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Davis v. Bandemer4 5 the distinction between political and racial gerrymanders becomes even more important. If the two phenomenon are
indistinguishable then Davis could undermine the application of nationwide
preclearance.
1. PoliticalGerrymanders
Davis held that a reapportionment plan which gave the Indiana Democratic party 43 percent of the legislative seats and the Republican party the
remaining 57 percent, even though the Democrats had won 51.9 percent of the
vote in the last election, does not violate the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.4 6
It is important to note that though there was some disagreement among
the Justices as to whether a political gerrymander was justiciable, all of the
Justices did agree that a racial gerrymander was justiciable.4 7
Nonetheless, it is questionable whether the Court would adopt the same
approach that it took in Davis to determine whether a racial gerrymander exists. In Davis the majority analyzed the result of the only election held after
the reapportionment plan and looked at the effect of the reapportionment plan
on the election of Democratic candidates as a whole. 48 In contrast, the appropriate inquiry in determining whether a racial minority's voting strength has
been co-opted out of the reapportionment plan solely because of their race is
to ascertain whether the present design of the reapportionment scheme is necessary to achieve some legitimate goal.49
2. Racial Gerrymanders
A racial gerrymander is an invidious type of discrimination and is unlike
a political gerrymander, which is the opportunity to redraw electoral districts
and, as such, one of the spoils of the political game. In fact, the mere act of
not distinguishing between the two avoids the real issue of racial groups joining together to keep out of the political arena a group that is of a different
race, 50 rather than the temporary exclusion of political group simply because
of a difference in political viewpoints.
While it is true that the majority of Blacks and other ethnic minorities are
"liberal" and have a tendency to align themselves with the Democratic Party5"
and consequently any political gerrymander that impinges upon the Democratic party has an adverse effect on the voting strength of racial minorities,
45. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
46. Id. at 127-43.
47. Id. at 124; id. at 160 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
48. See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (state reapportionment plan that deviated by an average of 1.9% in population among districts satisfies political fairness principle and does
not violate the equal protection clause).
49. See, eg., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (state must show with specificity that
population deviations in reapportionment plan were necessary to achieve the preservation of the voting strength of racial minority groups).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4.
51. Seeeg., N. NIE, S. VERBA, J. PETROCIK, THE CHANGING AMERICAN VOTER 253-55
(1976); D. IPPOLITO, T. WALKER & K. KOLSON, PUBLIC OPINION AND RESPONSIBLE DEMOCRACY
93-94 (1976); R. ABRAMSON, GENERATIONAL CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLITCs 76-82 (1975).

104

NATIONAL BLACK LAW JOURNAL

there is a substantial difference between political and racial gerrymanders. 2
Further the claim that one cannot tell which party an individual will vote
for is illusory as it is this basic assumption upon which gerrymanders are premised. This distinction is most apparent when the two party system is not as
strong as it often alleged. 3 For instance, in apportioning a politically liberal
legislative district the question on election day may not be so much as to
whether the Democratic or Republican Party will win the election as much as
which strand of the particular party will be in office.
Suppose a legislative district is composed of a highly concentrated group
of minority voters and has traditionally voted for the Democratic candidate.
If the minority voting group is divided into several districts when the district
lines are redrawn during apportionment, the reapportionment plan will still
result in a Democrat being elected but the candidate does not have to be sensitive to the needs of the minority voters.
One might question why a reapportionment plan might be drawn up to
dilute minority voting strength, especially when the minority group has traditionally voted for the particular political party in control of the reapportionment scheme. Such practices probably are not a manifestation of the fear of
not being reelected, as often the other party is not a viable alternative, but
rather are the manifestation of an irrational decision to discriminate on the
basis of race. This same motivating factor has historically prompted discrimination in the allocation of the goods and services of government.
Like the per se rule of one-person, one-vote for congressional districts,54 a
"mathematical formula" ought to be employed to ensure that large groups of
minority voters are not diluted beyond normal standards."
The adoption of such a formula would be two fold: the judiciary would
not intrude into the redistricting scheme and it would eliminate retrospecbe limited to
trovely ordered judicial remedies as the court's inquiry5 would
6
correctly.
applied
was
formula
the
whether
determining
As in other areas of constitutional law, the protecting an individual's constitutional right does often involve balancing competing constitutional rights
of others. But the process is not a zero-sum game, especially in the political
process arena, since when an individual's political right is protected another
individual does not "loose" rather the political process as a whole is
52. Racial gerrymanders are easy to detect if a particular racial group lives in a geographically
concentrated area and votes as a political group. Moreover, if there were, for instance, an independent Black political party, see Ahadi, An Independent Black PoliticalParty: Posing an Alternative to
Asses Elephants and Rainbows, 11 NAT'L. BLACK L.J. 117 (1989), then racial and political gerrymanders would be coterminous and require the same protections.

53. See, e.g., Davis, 478 U.S. at 156 (O'Connor, J., concurring) and Lowenstein and Steinberg,
The Questfor Legislative Districtingin the PublicInterest: Elusive or Illusory, 33 UCLA L. REV 1, 6
n.15.
54. Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
55. See supra note 36. Some scholars have already advanced mathematical formulas for determining whether a racial gerrymander exists. Engstom and Wildgen, Pruning Thorns from the
Thicket. An Empirical Test of the Existence of Racial Gerrymandering,4 LEGIS. STUDIES Q. 465,
469-73 (1977). Edwards, The Gerrymander and "One Man, One Vote," 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 879

(1971).
56. See, e.g., United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (creating a safe district
for minority voters to remedy a § 5 objection does not violate the equal protection clause nor the
fifteenth amendment).

NATIONAL BLACK LAW JOURNAL

105

validated.5 7
For example, if the electors in a legislature come from racially gerrymandered districts then all legislation that is passed is inherently suspect. But
if minority voters, who vote as a bloc are recognized then the legislation does
not have the same underlying presumption of discriminatory motive.5 8
B. NationalPreclearanceis a Preventive Rather Than Punitive Measure
Although Congress' grant of authority to enforce the fifteenth amendment is broad, it is not unlimited. Congress is empowered to enforce the substantive provisions of the amendment only through appropriate legislation.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in addressing the scope of Congress' authority under the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments has adopted a deferential
standard of review.5 9
"Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects
the [amendments] have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the
prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against State
denial or invasion,60if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power."
However, insofar as the Court relied upon the historical evidence within
the legislative history of the Act as a proxy for warranted legislative action,
then South Carolinav. Katzenbach does not present as strong an argument for
reliance on expanding section 5 nationally.
Presently preclearance is limited only by the historical anomaly of having
a literacy test on a given date. Since there are other ways to abridge the right
57. Contra Howard and Howard, The Dilemma of the Voting Rights Act-Recongnizing the
Emerging PoliticalEquality Norm, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1615, 1651-56 (1983).
58. It might appear to some that such a formulation is a "results-oriented" rather than a "process-oriented" approach to antidiscrimination law. See, e.g., Fiss, The Fate of an Idea Whose Time
Has Come: AntidiscriminationLaw in the Second Decade After Brown v. Boardof Education, 41 U.
CHI. L. REV. 742 (1974).

Yet from the racial minorities point of view the claim is consistent with the "perpetrator perspective" of racial discrimination. See, e.g., Feeman, LegitimizingRacialDiscrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A CriticalReview of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1052-57
(1978).
Another civil rights scholar put it more colloquially, but just as poignantly, when he wrote,
You know, friend, we civil rights lawyers spend our lives confronting whites in power with
the obvious racial bias in their laws or policies, and while, as you know, the litany of their
possible exculpatory responses is as long as life, they all boil down to: 'That's the way the
world is. We did not make the rules, we simply play by them, and you really have no
alternative but to do the same. Please don't take it personally.'
D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 44 (1987).

59. This deference is appropriate since the Civil War amendments were passed as a specific
hedge against the reserved powers of the states. See, e.g., Comment, The Inexorable Struggle to
Achieve PoliticalEquality: An Analysis of the Past and PresentIssues Concerning Voting Rights in
America, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 147 (1984) (authored by Jeffrey J. Lowe).
Moreover the Court has declared that Congress can pass laws to enforce the remedial as well as
substantive guarantees of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
301, 641, n.10 (1966); see also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983); Miss. Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); and City of Rome v. United
States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980). This doctrinal wrinkle is noteworthy in voting rights cases since these
cases traditionally involve violations of both amendments. See supra note 6.
60. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 34546 (1879). See also City of Rome v. United States, 446
U.S. 156, 176-77 (1980); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650-51 (1966); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326-27 (1966).
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to vote 61 a literacy test, on its own, does not indicate whether protection is
warranted. In other words, the fact that there was a literacy test in operation
in most of the South as of November 1, 1964, and the effective date of the
amendments to the Act, should not be a litmus test for protection against
minority vote dilution.
Professor Robert Cottrol believes that the law needs to acquire greater
historical sensibilities on the debate over racial justice. 62 He notes that the
terms of the debate over law and race has shifted to "a focus on the extent to
which the law can permit, or require remedial efforts to ameliorate the legacy
of American racism.",63 In advocating an extension beyond the traditional
outline and focus on the southern brand of de jure racism, Professor Cottrol
astutely observes:
"The North was more complex. Sharp lines were often drawn between
Black and white .

.

. [We need to look] beyond the statutes and judicial

pronouncements that established normative legal doctrines of racial egalitraianism .

.

. [we need] an examination of the behavior of law towards

Blacks in northern cities.... Often the legal historian will find that egalitarian doctrine pronounced by state appellate courts or legislatures may have
had relatively little effect on the actual behavior of police departments,
64 trial
courts, district attorneys, licensing commissions and school boards."
1. Race Discriminationin the North
It is generally conceded that a "color line" and an official policy of racial
discrimination existed in this country prior to the passage of the Civil War
amendments. 6 ' Even after the passage of the Civil War amendments, the
"separate but equal" doctrine was declared in Plessy v. Fergurson6 6 and became national policy. Thus the focus of inquiry should be on state action that
allowed the abridgement of the right to vote on account of race, the effective
use of the franchise since the passage of the fifteenth amendment, and state
discriminatory practices after the seminal decision of Brown v. Board of Education,67 since these are the wrongs addressed by the Act. 68 However historical evidence on the practices of states outside of the South between the 1860's
61. Such activities may include reprisals and intimidating those who are registered, in order to
ensure that they did not vote See, e.g., R. WARNER, NEW HAVEN NEGROES: A SOCIAL HISTORY
181 (1940).
62. Cottrol, Law, Politics and Race in Urban America: Towards a New Synthesis, 17 RUTGERS
L.J. 483 (1986).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 488-89. In a similar vein another researcher cautions, "[W]e must question conjectures
about the lives of ordinary Negroes in the far west until considerable research is done." D. DANIELS,
PIONEER URBANITES: A SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY OF BLACK SAN FRANCISCO 122 (1980).
65. See L. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790-1860
(1961) (study of the northern states before the Civil War demonstrating that Blacks in these states
were segregated "in virtually every phase of existence" and that a Jim Crow-type social order had
been established in the North before moving to the South); see also G. MOORE, NOTES ON THE
HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN MASSACHUSETTS (1866).
66.. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
67. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown had nationwide reverberation, see for example, Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses);
Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (golf courses); New Orleans City Park Improvement Assoc.
v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (parks).
68. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 315-17.
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to the 1980's is all but rare.6 9
Nevertheless historical evidence suggests that abridgment on account of
race was practiced nationwide, rather than regionally, as has been traditionally thought. This evidence also suggests that Blacks and other racial minorities were discriminated against solely on account of their race in attaining
important aspects of citizenship,7 ° consequently one can infer that the "most
precious jewel in the crown of civil liberties"7 1 was also abridged.
2.

Great Migration

After emancipation, many Blacks migrated from the southern plantations
to the then developing northern cities in the 1880's and 1890's.72 The Black
population in nine major northern cities increased by 36 percent in the 1880's
and by 75 percent in the 1890'S.7 3 Many states in the 1870's and 1880's enacted civil rights legislation and the rigid color line which had existed in publie accommodations before the Civil War wavered.74 Yet by the turn of the
century many former slaves lived in slave-like conditions.7 5
A second wave of Black migrants, the so-called Great Migration, occurred from 1910 to 1920 and a third exodus took place from the 1940's to the
1970's.76 The result of these waves of migration is that while in 1910, 75 percent of this nation's Black Americans lived in rural areas, 90 percent of those
in the South; but as of 1970, 75 percent of Blacks lived in cities and half resided outside of the southern states.77
Though there were undoubtedly as many reasons for relocating as there
were individuals who did relocate, it has been argued that this migration can
be explained as both a flight from oppression and a quest for a better life.7 8
But such a search ultimately proved to be illusive. A reversal in the relatively
69. D. DANIELS, supra note 64; K. KUSMER, A GHETTO TAKES SHAPE: BLACK CLEVELAND,
1870-1930 (1976); R. WARNER, supra note 61. See also Cottrol, supranote 62, at 484 n.5 and accompanying text.
70. See Karst, Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977).
71. Remarks of President Reagan on signing H.R. 3112 (1982 amendments of 1965 Voting
Rights Act) into law. 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 846 (June 29, 1982).
72. Even the western frontier also seemed more promising than the conditions in the South.
With the return of the former confederates to power in the 1880's, Henry Adams of Louisiana claims
to have organized 98,000 Blacks to go to the new western territory of Kansas. J. FRANKLIN, FROM
SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF THE NEGRO AMERICANS

399 (3rd. ed. 1967).

73. E. FORNER, AMERICA'S BLACK PAST 324 (1970).
74. It might be argued that since the right to vote was one of the civil rights legislative enactments, antidiscrimination legislation regarding voting rights, in general, and vote dilution, in particular, is inappropriate in the North. While it is true that during the Reconstruction period Blacks

enjoyed the favors of the Republican Party in the North and were elected in unprecedented numbers,
Blacks enjoyed relatively the same amount of success in the South-that fact has not inhibited nor
prohibited the enactment of antidiscrimination legislation directed toward the "solid South."
Some would still further maintain that what differentiates the South from the North was the
enactment of the Black Codes, or dejure segregation, which reinstituted slavery in all but name only
in the South. But changes in the economic conditions and political factions in the North all but did
the same there too, under the guise of what has been labeled de facto segregation. The distinction
between de jure and de facto segregation is unpursuasive when it involves a fundamental constitutional right such as voting.
75. E. FORNER, supra note 73, at 324.

76. Id.
77. Id. at 325.
78. Id.
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good race relations occurred when Northerners experienced new competition
for jobs and housing.79 Not only did this friction erupt in racial violence that
pitted Blacks against Whites, in such cities as New York, Chicago, Springfield,
Ohio in 19048" and Springfield, Illinois in 190881 and East St. Louis, but it was
later evident in the practices of the cities and private parties within them as
evidenced in the race riots of the late 1960's.
Thus to continue to focus of antidiscrimination legislation solely on the
deep South not only ignores the migration of millions of individuals to other
regions of the nation but it also discounts the discriminatory practices in those
areas. Further, the guarantees of the Civil War amendments will still be illusive anywhere but in the South.8 2
A few illustrative cities will show that the denial of the effective participation in government and the goods and services derived therefrom occurred in a
practical sense, throughout the nation, as it was legally prescribed in the
South, and that this denial is reflective of what went asunder for all racial
minorities.
a.

Chicago

Before the Great Migration, when Chicago was run by the Republican
Party, Blacks only got the crumbs from the political table in order to ensure
that they did not vote Democratic. 3 Yet, in still, Chicago was perceived as a
land of opportunity,8 4 partly because it was a growing, industrial city and
partly because its politics were factional and based upon ethnic coalition
building.
Because of this need for coalition building each new ethnic group had to
be wooed and as a consequence Blacks and other ethnic minorities had at least
a formal chance to participate in politics.8 By 1920 Chicago Blacks had
achieved more in politics, when measured86 in terms of participation and patronage than in any other American city.

Yet in terms of other minority groups Blacks still were treated differently.
For instance, Blacks got menial jobs from the patronage system. That is,
while Blacks were employed as janitors in city government above their proportion in the population, their proportion in the clerical ranks was below their
population proportion.87 Furthermore, Blacks also received their patronage
from the system at a lower rate than other minorities and the political
79. At the turn of the century Syracuse, Ohio went so far as to forbid Blacks from settling within

city limits. J. FRANKLIN, supra note 72, at 443.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Such would indeed be an odd turn of events. For an earlier analysis of this type of argument
see, Karst, Not One Law at Rome and Another atAthens: The FourteenthAmendment in Nationwide
Application, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 383 (1972).
83. I. KATZNELSON, BLACK MEN, WHITE CITIES: RACE, POLITICS, AND MIGRATION IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1900-38, AND BRITAIN, 1948-68, at 91 (1973).

84. The word on the grapevine was that Chicago was the place. "Chicago for a while seemed to
be everything. You could not rest in your bed at night for Chicago," a Hattiesburg, Mississippi
resident is claimed to have said. E. SCOTT, NEGRO MIGRATION DURING THE WAR (1920) (quoted in
KATZNELSON, supra note 83, at 86.)

85. Id. at 111-13.
86. Id. at 95.
87. Id. at 98.
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88
machine did not provide adequate police protection in Black neighborhoods.
In sum, Blacks had no real alternative as even the political machine had a
stake in maintaining the status quo.89 Furthermore, while other ethnics could
get reciprocation and patronage from the machine, Blacks were detached and
obligated to the machine. Although Blacks in the North had at least the
power to vote, "new, more indirect, but almost equally powerless quasi-colonial patterns of racial dominance and social control replaced the Southern
colonial system." 90 Ironically, in an ethnically heterogeneous, machine-run
city whose factional brand of politics was based on ethnic coalition building
and maintaining electoral districts that were ethnically based, the most identifiable racial group was still on the outside looking in. 91
In comparison with other cities throughout the nation, Chicago is the
exception rather than the rule since there was a Black political machine, but in
comparison with the political forces within the city, Blacks were held at arms
length as their political organizations was dominated by a citywide
organization.9 2

b.

New York

Another northern city that allowed Blacks the opportunity to formally
participate in the political process was New York City. They could do little
more. It is important to note that, as in Chicago, there was an established
political machine in operation when the largest influx of Black migrants settled in New York's Harlem district. Consequently, not only was there was not
a viable alternative political party, but Blacks could not bargain within the
established party.
One historian claims that Harlem's political power was not a wedge for
economic development as it could have been nor was it translatable into economic and social mobility for its practitioners, rather political powerlessness
was the norm for the generation that lived in that area.93 He concludes that as
a result of this political powerlessness the social and economic problems of the
city's Blacks grew to unmanageable proportions. 94
The rewards that Blacks did get were conferred on a few handpicked
leaders. This was used as an instrument of political deception. The most telling worth of Black participation in the party is that not only were they treated
differently than other ethnic groups, but they were not even allowed into the
88. Id. at 101.
89. Id. at 103.
90. Id. at 109. The author continues,
"[1]ike most of us, the Southern black migrants tended to see history in terms of images; the
North, for them was the North of Lincoln, the Abolitionists, the Freeman's Bureau, the
Radical Republicans-a North of hope. This pattern of images, however, was seriously
distorted, the hope misplaced, for in the North in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, anti-black racism was part of the region's conventional wisdom."
Id. at 115.
91. Present day Chicago perhaps best evidences this continuing practice. In 1986 when the late
Harold Washington ran for reelection for mayor, Councilman Vrdolyak, a lifetime white Democrat
switched to the Republican Party in order to challenge Washington in the general election. Moreover, after Washington's death the in-fighting within the Democratic Party continues and is largely
divided among racial lines.
92. Id. at 118.
93. Id. at 66.
94. Id.
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district political clubs, but had to form their own. For instance, Edward Chief
Lee was picked to head the United Colored Democracy (UCD) of Tammany
Hall. But his political power was more illusory than real. On paper, Lee controlled the doling out of patronage positions, in reality, the UCD was a segregated institution whose primary tasks were winning votes for Tammany Hall
and isolating Blacks from positions of real political influence.95
It seems that Blacks were only formally a part of the political process as
ultimately they were unwanted.
"[Thus the question] is not whether blacks in New York could participate in
the city's politics (they could), nor are we concerned here with shifts in electoral behaviour, in the period of migration, but rather, with the terms of
participation, with the critical
structural decisions that limited and shaped
'9 6
behavioural possibilities."
c.

Cleveland

Cleveland, Ohio presents another interesting view of the efforts of the
newly arrived Blacks to participate in the political system. In 1884 a state
civil rights act was passed, but when Blacks brought suits to enforce these laws
they were not always successful. By 1928 these antidiscrimination laws were a
dead letter. 97
In the political arena, although in the late 1880's Blacks were initially
well received by White voters, by 1907 Black candidates were less appealing to
Whites as evidenced by the establishment of a White only direct primary.
Further, from 1910 to 1920 no Black candidate could get enough White votes
to win an election.9"
By 1916 an increasing number of White residents wanted to keep Black
residents out of their neighborhoods. This segregation in housing patterns
may be indicative of the potential occurrence of racial gerrymanders. An increasing segregationist trend was also evident in public accommodations and
the public school system.
In sum, Cleveland Blacks became increasingly aware that southern race
prejudice was bearing its malignant fruit in their city. Unsurprisingly when
Blacks became aware of this increasing racial hostility to their participation in
the social system, Black political participation reached its highwater mark.
Three Blacks sat on the city council in the 1920-30's but by the heart of the
Depression Era Black political power had evaporated. 99
95. Id. at 69.
96. Id. at 83-84.
97. K. KUSMER, supra note 69, at 59 and 181.
98. Id. at 64-65.
99. Blacks were not to enjoy the benefits of their formal participation in the electoral system
until 1969 when Carl B. Stokes was elected mayor of Cleveland. Though it is highly speculative as to
why it took so long for another Black to attain such political prominence, the three councilmen may
have been gerrymandered out of office. Id. at 273-74. For a further discussion of this genre of Black
politics, see C. WYE, MIDwEST GHETTO: PATTERNS OF NEGRO LIFE AND THOUGH IN CLEVELAND, OHIO, 1929-45 (Ph.D. dissertation, Kent State U. 1973); S.DRAKE AND H. CAYTON, BLACK

METROPOLIS: A STUDY OF NEGRO LIFE IN A NORTHERN CITY 346-51 (1970); H. GOSNELL, NEGRO POLITICIANS: THE RISE OF NEGRO POLITICS IN CHICAGO (1935).

Stokes' election may be fatal to a claim under § 2, but under § 5 his victory does not go to the
issue of whether overall minority voting strength has been diluted.
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d.

California

California is representative of the some of the racially discriminatory
practices that went on west of the Mississippi River. However, since there
were relatively fewer Blacks before the 1920's who could be targets for these
practices, the victims of racism were primarily those of Asian decent. 1°
For example, it has been noted that Chinese laborers were employed in
conditions that had all of the earmarks of slavery. I10 Like their counterparts
in northern communities, the number of Asians living within the city limits of
Los Angeles became an issue after 1876.1°2 In order to drive them out of
business and out of the city, a tax was passed.103
Asians were the victims of racism in northern California also. The administration of public licensing has become one of the most famous United
States Supreme Court cases."
Also in San Francisco light skinned Blacks "passed" as Spanish or Portuguese in order to minimize the amount of discrimination that they would receive. 10 ' Nonetheless race discrimination and racial prejudice towards Blacks
became more prevalent after the large influx of Blacks in the 1920's.
In Sacramento there were efforts to prevent Japanese workers from being
strike breakers. Even when Japanese tried to do better for themselves, their
efforts were thwarted. For instance, college educated Japanese were denied
managerial level jobs and were forced to engage in menial labor. 106
III.
A.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND NATIONALIZATION OF
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW

School Busing

A parallel source for the expansion of an antidiscrimination a doctrine
that emanated in the South but that now has nationwide application are the
school desegregation cases. A similar expansion of the antidiscrimination protections of voting rights is appropriate because voting is a constitutionally protected right.
The groundwork for national integration of schools was laid in Green v.
County School Board.10 7 The New Kent County, Virginia school board employed a freedom of choice plan, which allowed parents to decide what school
to send their children to, as a means of implementing the Brown decision. The
100. Though the historical evidence is scarce because there was not legally mandated segregation

should not be interpreted as evidence of no discrimination. In questioning about public accommodations, one hotel operator candidly responded, "It is our law never to give accommodation to Negroes." D. DANIELS, supra note 64 at 108.
101. Sandmeyer, The Basis ofAnti-Chinese Sentiment, in RACISM IN CALIFORNIA: A READER IN
THE HISTORY OF OPPRESSION 81 (R. Daniels and S. Olin, Jr. eds. 1972).
102. Locklear, The Anti-Chinese Movement in Los Angeles, in RACISM IN CALIFORNIA, supranote

101, at
103.
104.
toward

97.
Id. at 100-01.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (discriminatory application of licensing ordinance
Chinese laundrymen violates the fourteenth amendment).

105. D. DANIELS. supra note 64 at 129.

106. Cole, History of the Japanese Community in Sacramento, 1883-1972: Organizations,Businesses and GenerationalResponse to Majority Domination and Stereotypes 57 (M.A. thesis, Cal. St.U.
Sacramento 1973)
107. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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Court reasoned that since New Kent County had a history of de jure segregated school systems the issue was whether the fourteenth amendment merely
required desegregation or compelled integration. The court held that the
school boards had the duty to achieve integration.
Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education01 8 was the next significant case. It addressed the problem of applying the mandate of Green in a
large southern metropolitan area. The North Carolina case involved a school
district that also had a history of de jure segregation. Consistent with Green,
the Court noted that it was now the duty of the federal courts to eliminate
from the public school system all vestiges of state-imposed segregation.
Swann is important because of the broad discretionary powers that it confers
on the federal judiciary to remedy the results of purposeful discrimination.
Two years later the Court decided Keyes v. School DistrictNo. 1, Denver,
Colo.' 0 9 Keyes is significant because in that case the Court considered school
desegregation in a major city out outside of the South. The Park Hill section
of Denver, Colorado was before the court in Keyes. Denver does not have a
history of de jure discrimination, in fact, the state constitution prohibited racial classifications of students.' 10 At issue, was whether the actions of the
school board evidenced an intent to segregate and maintain a segregated
school system. If there was such an intent, then de jure discrimination could
be inferred and would allow the federal district court to invoke its broad remedial powers under Swann.
Justice Brennan wrote for the Court and he set forth criteria that would
facilitate a finding of purposeful discrimination and the appropriate remedies
for such a violation. The correct legal standard for deciding school desegregation required proof that the school authorities pursed intentional segregative
policy in the core center schools by finding the existence of a dual system,
absent a showing that the district was divided into clearly unrelated units.
Such a finding shifts the burden to the school officials to prove that their actions were not motivated by segregative intent."'
After finding that the defendants failed to rebut the presumption the
Court concluded that it was appropriate to order desegregation to the districts
2
that had been adversely affected."
It is important to note that the actions of the school board were scrutinized in order to ascertain whether there was purposeful discrimination and,
in this sense Keyes is consistent with cases involving southern school boards
because it adheres to the purpose-impact distinction in antidiscrimination law.
Yet the most relevant of the school desegregation cases are Columbus
108. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).

109. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
110. COLO. CONST. IX, § 8 (cited in Keyes, 413 U.S. at 191).
111. "[There was no] dejure segregation but where [there was] carried out systematic program of
segregation affecting students it is only common sense to conclude that there is a dual system."
Keyes, 413 U.S. at 201.
112. Justice Powell, in partial dissent, wanted to eliminate the distinction between dejure and de
facto segregation and rely upon Green and Swann as establishing an affirmative duty of integration.
Keyes, 413 U.S. at 224 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting). Later Justice Powell noted, "[i]ndeed

if one goes back fat enough, it is probable that all racial segregation, wherever occurring and whether
or not confined to the schools, has at sometime been supported or maintained by government action
.. " Id. at 228 n.12.

NATIONAL BLACK LAW JOURNAL

113

Board of Education v. Penick 3 and Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman." 4 Not only did both cases consider the practices of northern school
district, but the Court conceded that there was not a history of statutorily
mandated segregation in the twentieth century Ohio. Moreover, for the
Court, the starting point of analysis was when Brown was decided, that is, the
Court considered whether in 1954 if there was a racially neutral unitary school
system in operation in the respective school districts. The Court concluded
that there was not. Thus with the finding of de jure segregation in 1954 as its
underpinning, the Court concluded that it was appropriate to order
integration.
Penick still maintains the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation. When the Court turned away from the effects of past segregation to
consider the present practice of establishment of dual school systems, it no
longer asked whether there was discriminatory purpose but rather whether the
dual system had been abandoned. The conclusion in each case was that the
school board had not abandoned the dual system, because it had not taken
steps to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation.
A limit on the extent of the remedy available in interdistrict desegregation was announced in Milliken v. Bradley.I 5 In Milliken the Court held that
absent intradistrict violations there was no basis for an interdistrict remedy
and as such it was inappropriate to order busing across interdistrict lines.
Some might interpret Milliken to defeat the application of nationwide
preclearance of legislative reapportionments and executive annexations since
adhering to the the one-person, one-vote rule would inherently involve the
restructuring of neighboring districts. However such an interpretation is short
sighted. Chief Justice Burger, in his opinion for the Court in Milliken,' 16 conceded that equipopulous racial gerrymandering, in one district by definition,
does impact the supposedly "innocent" districts. Therefore whenever even a
single legislative district is racially gerrymandered not only is the whole reapportionment plan tainted but subsequent legislative and executive decisions
are also inherently suspect.
B. Preclearanceof Redistricting Schemes
The ground work has been laid for an analogous interpretation and expansion of nationwide application of section 5's preclearance requirement.
The scope of section 5 had been limited by section 4(b), but this limitation
may well be illusory. In 1970, when the Act was amended, the use of literacy
tests were suspended throughout the nation, not just in those areas covered
under section 5. The Court found the suspension constitutional in Oregon v.
Mitchell.117
Since Oregon obviated the "trigger" of section 5 and with the discovery of
past discriminatory practices outside of the "solid South," it is nothing more
than a historical anomaly that racial gerrymanders can be- practiced in the
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

443 U.S. 449 (1979).
443 U.S. 526 (1979).
418 U.S. 717 (1974).
Id. at 744-45.
400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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majority of this nation's state and political subdivisions."1 This is not to say
that nationwide preclearance is punitive, but is rather a prophylactic remedial
measure to ensure the substantive guarantees of the fifteenth amendment.
1. A Proposalfor NationalPreclearance
Commentators have repeatedly advocated extending section 5 to apply
nationally. 9 One particular proposal by William Keady and George
Cochran, uses the number of Black elected officials as a proxy of the effectiveness of minority voting strength. 120 They present evidence that states traditionally thought of as free of discriminatory practices do not have as many
Black elected officials as the potential voting strength of Black residents. Consequently they infer that vote dilution occurs. The authors then note that
after the implementation of section 5 there has been an increase in the number
of Black voter registrants in the South,12 1 and consequently advocate extending section 5 to apply nationally.
The authors propose that, with the exclusion of states or political subdivisions with de minimis percentage of minorities, political entities should have
to bring suits for preclearance of electoral alterations that have the potential
for discrimination in the local federal district court. These suits would be
given a priority setting. The relief available would be identical to that under
the present statute. Interested parties would be notified of the proposed electoral change and the pending suit when the claim is filed and could intervene
as a matter of right within sixty days. 122
If the United States or an interested party did not answer within sixty
days then an uncontested judgment would be entered for the political subdivision. But the uncontested judgment would not preclude subsequent constitutional challenges. Decisions adverse to the United States or those defending
on its behalf would be stayed upon filing notice of appeal. The appeals process
would be expedited.
If constitutional counterclaims were defenses, then the preclearance issue
118. Besides with the 1982 amendments to § 4, which allow bailout, and the application of the

non-retrogression standard, it appears that if states and political subdivisions do not practice racial
gerrymanders then the prophylactic use of national preclearance will not warrant undue intervention
or delay of proposed redistricting schemes.
119. See, e.g., EXTENSION OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON
CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM. 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS.
169 (1975) (testimony of J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division); 121
Cong. Rec. 24,139 (1975) (proposal by Sens. Talmadge and Nunn); id. at 24,220 (letter from President Ford stating, in part, "Discrimination in voting in any part of the nation is equally
undesirable.")
120. Keady and Cochran, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: A Time for Revision, 69 Ky. L.J. 741

(1981).
121. Because of the secret ballot it is difficult to ascertain exactly how many of these new registrants actually do vote.

122. This is perhaps the most significant aspect of the proposal especially in light of the fact that
the Reagan Administration was, at best, reluctant, and, at worst, openly hostile to the recognition
and expansion of civil rights law. See, e.g., JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AND VOTING RIGHTS ACT ENFORCEMENT: POLITICAL INTERFERENCE AND RETREAT (1982); Days, Turning Back the Clock;
The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 309 (1984); Days, Holding
the Line, 20 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1 (1986); Leadership Conf. on Civil Rights, Without Justice, 8
BLACK L.J. 29 (1983); Greenburg, Civil Rights Enforcement Activity of the Department of Justice, 8
BLACK

L.J. 60 (1983); Washington Council of Lawyers, Reagan Civil Rights: The First Twenty

Months, 8 BLACK L.J. 68 (1983).
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would be severed and decided at that point, while the defenses could be adjudicated later.123
Keady and Cochran present one of the most detailed and legally viable
proposals for nationwide preclearance, but their proposal is problematic in
that it does not go far enough.
While it is noteworthy that the Act has resulted in more individuals registering, it is my claim that individuals can not only be registered but actually
vote in elections, and yet if they live in a racial gerrymander their vote will still
be diluted. Consequently, a focus on the the increase in the number of registered Black voters and Black elected officials is misplaced.
Besides, with the recognition that at large districts dilute minority voting
strength, 2 4 antidiscrimination law ought to focus on creating single member
districts and ought to ensure that discriminatory line drawing does not
25
occur. 1

Therefore, in addition to the above proposal, and to eliminate potential
administrative problems with nationwide preclearance, cases should be tried
in the local federal district courts, with the right to appeal to one of the intermediate federal court such as the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or the District of Columbia Court of Appeal and
then to the United States Supreme Court. Prior concerns about the jurisprudence of southern jurists' 26 can be assuaged because of the extensive development of preclearance law. But most importantly, in order to adhere to
equipopulous districting there may be a continuing need to refer to the census,
not as a guarantee of proportional representation, 127 but more as an assurance
that population changes have not fluctuated significantly and undercut the significance of a non-discriminatory electoral scheme.
CONCLUSION

Section 5 of the 1965 Voting Rights Act ought to be interpreted to apply
nationwide because, as that portion of the Act has been interpreted, it requires
less empirical evidence than its "alternative," section 2. More specifically, section 5 is advantageous in that it can eliminate, or at least diminish, the practice of gerrymanders that dilute the vote of racial minorities in a
geographically concentrated area.
123. Keady and Cochran, supra note 120, at 781-83.
124. White v. Regester. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
125. See, e.g., Blacksher, Drawing Single-member Districts to Comply with the Voting Rights
Amendments of 1982, 17 URB. LAW. 347 (1985).
126. Keady and Cochran, supra note 120, at 749-54.
127. One leading civil rights scholar has considered some of the problems involved in amending
the voting rights laws to guarantee proportional representation. BELL, supra note 58 at 75-101. See
also Levinson, Gerrymanderingand the Brooding Omnipresence ofProportionalRepresentation: Why
Won't It go Away, 33 UCLA L. REv. 257, 259 (1985) ("[T]here is something almost comic about
assuming either judicial caution or the inherent legitimacy of the way we have chosen to structure
political contests in this country.").
One of the strongest arguments against such a scheme is that it may increase the sense of racial
differences on election day. BELL supra note 58, at 90. See also Wright v. Rockerfeller, 376 U.S. 52,
66 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Advocates of proportional representation claim that it the way to political power for Blacks and
other racial minorities. Arguably such an argument only serves to relegitimize, rather than revitalize
the electoral system. See, eg., Brown, The Myths and Promise of American Democracy, 11 NAT'L
BLACK L.J. 13 (1989).
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Throughout the history of the United States racial minorities have been
treated similarly, both in and outside of the political arena. Consequently, the
underlying assumption that vote dilution, in general, and racial gerrymanders,
in particular, is more heinous in the once "solid South" than in other parts of
the nation is untrue.
The Constitution does not limit nationwide application of section 5, if
anything the history and purpose of the Civil War amendments would allow
nationwide preclearance. Thus proposals advocating nationwide preclearance
should not be summarily rejected. A pragmatic reading of the present Act
warrants nationwide preclearance of redistricting changes.
This interpretation of the Act is not unprecedented, but is entirely consistent with the recognition of race as a factor in a voter's political choice. Furthermore, an accurate comparison of the realistic application of
antidiscrimination law with our racially cognizant society are the "second
wave" of school desegregation cases.
These cases demonstrate how a doctrine that had its genesis in the South
was applied in other areas of the country. Furthermore as antidiscrimination
doctrine of school desegregation has expanded, notions of de facto and de jure
discrimination have likewise undergone a metamorphosis. Accordingly, a
similar doctrinal development is not only possible, but appropriate for national preclearance of electoral alterations in order to eliminate racial gerrymanders throughout the United States and to fully implement the fifteenth
amendment.

